5. The Motivational and Cognitive Dynamics of Day-to-Day Social Life

JOHN B. NEZLEK

This chapter presents a model describing relationships among the cognitive and motivational dynamics of day-to-day social life and psychological well-being and describes the results of studies supporting parts of the model. The model rests upon three complementary assumptions. The first is that people's daily lives reflect the integration of two basic needs (among others), the need to belong and the need for control and predictability in one's life. Although both of these needs may be thought of as motives, the second tends to be conceptualized in more cognitive terms than the first, which tends to be conceptualized as having a stronger affective component. The second assumption is that understanding people's daily lives requires distinguishing the processes responsible for how people allocate their time (the quantitative components of daily life) from the processes responsible for how people react to daily experience (the qualitative components).

The model further assumes that the needs for prediction and control are related more closely to the quantitative components of day-to-day life than they are to the qualitative components. What people do each day (the people they meet, the activities in which they engage, etc.) is more heavily influenced by cognitive processes and by the needs for prediction and control than are people's reactions to these events. In contrast, the need to belong is related more closely to the qualitative

components of day-to-day life than it is to the quantitative components. Moreover, such distinctions are more pronounced when considering social events than they are when considering nonsocial events.

The model draws on research and theory on various topics, including day-to-day social interaction, daily plans and their fulfillment, relationships between daily events and day-to-day psychological states, and relationships between life goals and daily behaviors. The model relies on research and theory on these topics because although daily life consists of much more than social life, research using a wide variety of methods indicates clearly that people spend a considerable portion of each day with others. Consequently, understanding the motivational and cognitive dynamics of daily life necessarily provides insight into the motivational and cognitive dynamics of daily interpersonal behavior.

This chapter complements the other chapters in this volume in several ways. First, the present model emphasizes a temporal unit (the day) as an organizing theme, whereas the other chapters use persons, events, or some combination of these as organizing themes. Given the power of the circadian cycle in determining a broad array of human behaviors, it is difficult to imagine that the day is not a powerful organizing unit for human social behavior. Second, the present model places more emphasis on social systems and their norms and roles as influences on social behavior than do most of the other chapters. By definition, social behavior requires the presence of other people, and it seems that people invariably form collectives, collectives that provide a structure within which people behave.

The model also concerns interpersonal behavior at an aggregate level rather than at the level of the specific behavior or interpersonal exchange. This level was chosen because some psychologically meaningful phenomena may exist only within broader temporal and situational contexts. For example, understanding the extent to which people's social lives meet their plans and expectations requires knowing people's plans for various types of·activities across time and various situations.

Belonging and Prediction and Control as Dimensions of a Framework

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Belonging and Prediction and Control as Dimensions of a Framework

The present model's assumption that two basic motives underlie day-to-day life (and social life) reflects the integration of a broad array of

theories and supporting research. Needs or motives for prediction and control have figured heavily in scholarship concerning attribution, task motivation, reactions to stressful events, and a host of other topics. The need to belong has also figured heavily in scholarship on various topics, although with some recent exceptions (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), this need has not been discussed with a focus as sharp as that of discussions concerning the need for prediction and control. Furthermore, few attempts have been made to understand day-to-day social behavior within a conceptual framework relying on two constructs such as these.

The present two-dimensional framework is similar to other two-dimensional typologies, including Freud's classic distinction between *Arbeit* and *Lieb*, as well as more contemporary research on group processes and leadership (instrumental vs. socioemotional functions) and interpersonal style (agency vs. communion). The same distinction has also been made in research on strivings. For example, Emmons (1991) compared people who had achievement and affiliative goals. The parallel between these typologies and the present model is predicated on the correspondence between agentic and instrumental aspects of daily life and cognitively focused needs for prediction and control, and between socioemotional and communal aspects and more affectively focused needs for belongingness.

Quantity and Quality of Day-to-Day Social Interaction and Psychological Well-Being

An important impetus for the present model was a series of studies on day-to-day social interaction using variants of the Rochester Interaction Record (RIR; Wheeler & Nezlek, 1977). Participants in these studies used standardized forms to describe the social interactions they had each day. These descriptions included the others present during the interaction, when the interaction began, and how long it lasted; these data provided measures of the quantity and distribution of social contact. Participants also provided various ratings of their reactions to the interaction, and these ratings constituted measures of the quality of interactions.

Taken together, these studies suggest that quantity and quality of social interaction are markedly different constructs. First, measures of quantity such as interactions per day, and measures of quality such as intimacy and enjoyment, are correlated only weakly, if at all (e.g.,

unpublished analyses of data presented in Nezlek 1993, 1995, 1999; Nezlek, Hampton, & Shean, 2000; Nezlek, Reis, & Cunningham, 1999). Second, and more important, measures of quantity tend to be unrelated to measures of psychological well-being, whereas measures of quality tend to be positively related to well-being.

For example, in Nezlek, Imbrie, and Shean (1994), college students used a variant of the RIR to describe their day-to-day social interactions. Compared to those who were not at risk for depression, participants who were at risk, as measured by the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression scale (CES-D) (Radloff, 1977), found their interactions to be less enjoyable and intimate and felt less confident and influential in their interactions. Nezlek et al. (1994) did not find differences in amount of social contact between those at risk and not at risk.

The same pattern of results was found by Nezlek et al. (2000) in a study of adults living in the community, half of whom meet DSM criteria for clinical depression and half of whom served as a control group. The results of hierarchical linear modeling analyses indicated that depressed participants found their interactions to be less enjoyable and intimate and felt less influential in their interactions. Nezlek et al. (2000) did not find differences between the two groups in amount of social contact. Moreover, similar patterns of results have been found in studies of the relationships between social interaction and measures of more specific aspects of adjustment such as body image (Nezlek, 1999) and the use of humor as a coping mechanism (Nezlek & Derks, in press).

Relationships between measures of interaction quality and psychological well-being have also been found in studies of causal relationships between such constructs. Based upon structural equation modeling of data collected in a panel study conducted over 2 years, Nezlek (in press-a) found that changes in social skills (interpreted in part as an indirect measure of social acceptance) were related to changes in a latent factor representing quality of social interaction. There were no relationships between social skills and quantity of social interaction. Similarly, Nezlek et al. (1999) found that a latent factor representing quality of interaction led to changes in a latent factor representing psychological well-being. Nezlek et al. (1999) also found no relationships between well-being and quantity of social interaction.

Null results frequently raise questions about the adequacy of the design, power, and other characteristics of a study, and such questions can be raised about each of the studies just cited. Nonetheless,

quantity of social interaction and well-being were found to be unrelated, whereas quality of interaction and well-being were related:

1. in different samples (collegians and adults in the community);
2. across different operationalizations of well-being (subclinical and clinical depression, measures of specific personality constructs, and a multivariate latent construct);
3. across different operationalizations of interaction quality; and
4. across different analytic methods (ordinary least squares, hierarchical linear modeling, and structural equation modeling).

Moreover, in all but one of these studies the sample was larger than 100, and for traditional ordinary least squares analyses a sample of 100 provides a power of approximately .85 to detect effects (expressed as correlations) of .30 or larger. It should also be noted that such a conclusion is consistent with that of Marangoni and Ickes's (1989) review of research on loneliness. They noted that "*qualitative* considerations are more important than *quantitative* considerations in mediating the relationship between social network variables and the experience of loneliness" (p. 97).

From some perspectives, the lack of relationships between interaction quantity and well-being may be counterintuitive. For example, some research on social support suggests that psychological well-being is positively related to the size of people's support networks. The apparent difference between the conclusion of this research and research on social interaction can be understood by considering differences between the two bodies of research in how quantity of social contact is measured. Research on support networks frequently focuses on the number of *supportive* people one *knows* and measures, and by implication, the amount of support one can receive when it is needed. In constrast, research on social interaction measures the number of people with whom one interacts, the number of interactions one has, and the amount of time one spends with others, irrespective of the social support provided or received in an interaction.

People spend time with others for a wide variety of reasons, and supportive interactions, the explicit focus of research on social support, probably constitute a minority of interactions for most people at most times. This contention is supported by two studies. In a study by Sullivan, Nezlek, and Jackson (1996), college student participants maintained a variant of the RIR, and in addition to providing the standard information about each interaction (discussed previously), they

indicated how much social support they received during the interaction. In only 14% of interactions did participants report receiving high levels of support (a rating of 4 or more on a 7-point scale), and in 38% they reported receiving no support at all. In a similar study, by Barbee, Felice, Cunningham, and Berry (1993), participants described in detail the social support they provided or received during an interaction if they provided or received support; these additional data were provided for only 25% of interactions.

Regardless of the percentage of interactions that explicitly involve social support, the fact that quantity of social interaction and psychological well-being are unrelated may be somewhat counterintuitive. For example, many psychologists and laypeople think of isolated and lonely people as suffering due to their isolation, and the emphasis in many forms of therapy is to help people become more fully integrated into some form of social network. Yet it is important to note that *none* of the nine A-criteria used in the DSM to diagnose clinical depression refer explicitly to quantity of social contact. The criteria that refer to sociality refer to quality of contact. The DSM criteria are also consistent with research suggesting that quality of support, not quantity, provides a buffer against psychological distress such as depression (e.g., Sheldon & West, 1989).

The lack of relationships between well-being and quantity of social contact, combined with the existence of reliable relationships between well-being and quality of social interaction, suggests that the quantity and quality of social interaction are regulated by or reflect different processes. The present model assumes that more cognitively focused processes centering on needs for prediction and control govern quantitative aspects of social life, whereas qualitative aspects reflect processes centering on the need to belong. Moreover, psychological well-being is related more closely to the satisfaction of the need to belong than to the satisfaction of the need for prediction and control.

A Working Model of the Dynamics of Daily Life

The working model presented in this chapter describes the dynamics of daily life (including daily social life) and the relationships between day-to-day social life and psychological health. Different parts of the model are explained in more detail than others, depending upon the available data and relevant theories. The model, depicted in Figure 5.1, incorporates the following:

Figure 5.1. The dynamics of day-to-day activities and their relationships to psychological health.

1. People have and make plans for their daily activities.
2. The daily activities in which people engage are primarily the result of these plans.
3. These activities provide various outcomes for people, outcomes that are difficult to plan with certainty.
4. These outcomes influence people's psychological health, both directly and indirectly.
5. Environmentally initiated and self-initiated events that were not planned or anticipated also influence people's psychological health in ways similar to the influence of planned or anticipated events.

In terms of the two organizing themes, the need for prediction and control and the need to belong, the model emphasizes the close relationship between the need for prediction and control and the formulation and enacting of plans, and the close relationship between outcomes of social events and the need to belong. In part, these differences reflect the realities of life and social life. I can much more readily plan what I will do (e.g., a social activity) than I can plan the outcome of that activity. Moreover, the need to belong is probably more affective in nature than it is cognitive, and so it is difficult for this need to be met by more cognitively focused activities such as the fulfillment of plans.

Formation of Plans for Daily Living

Daily plans have not been studied extensively, although they have been discussed. For example, daily plans were highlighted in the first few pages of Miller, Galanter, and Pribam's (1960) influential book *Plans and the Structure of Behavior*. The authors noted, "Whether it is crowded or empty, novel or routine, uniform or varied, your day has a structure of its own – it fits into the texture of your life. And as you think what your day will hold, you construct a plan to meet it" (p. 5). They noted further that these plans may not be exact or precise: "[plans] probably have some relation to how you spend your time during the day ... [although] you do not draw out long and elaborate blueprints for every moment of the day ... all you need is the name of the activity that you plan for that moment of the day, and from that you proceed to elaborate the detailed actions in carrying out the plan" (pp. 5–6). Curiously, they did not discuss the construct of a daily plan any further.

The present model assumes that daily plans reflect a combination of individuals' motives and dispositions, their expectations about the

likelihood that they can exhibit certain behaviors, their obligations to meet the normative requirements of role occupancy, and their largely unconscious, habitual, ingrained patterns of behavior. Dispositions include a broad array of personality characteristics, particularly those that may be directly relevant to planning and goal setting, such as Kuhl's state and action orientations (Kuhl, 1985). Motives include various constructs, such as personal strivings (Emmons, 1989), life goals (Cantor, 1994), or the need for self-determination (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Expectations refer more to people's beliefs about their ability to exhibit a certain behavior than to their beliefs about whether a certain behavior will lead to a certain outcome.

The present model differs from much previous research in its emphasis on normative expectations and ingrained patterns. As discussed by Katz and Kahn (1978) and other more sociologically focused scholars, a considerable portion of human behavior can be understood in terms of meeting role requirements and obligations. Given the enduring nature of most role obligations, people's daily plans typically incorporate such obligations.

The incorporation of roles into routine plans and behaviors may also be understood within the context of Bargh's (1990) work on automaticity. Bargh has suggested that engaging in a behavior over and over makes the behavior (and accompanying cognitions) more automatic and less subject to conscious control and, by implication, less influenced by changes in motives. Plans and routines combine to produce behavioral regularity, including the regularity of day-to-day social interaction.[1]

Although goals and daily plans share features such as a future orientation, the present model makes important distinctions between them. *Plans* refer to fairly specific activities or behavioral sequences such as "I plan to have dinner with Dick and Jane tonight." In contrast, *goals* usually refer to desired outcomes such as "I want to get to know Dick and Jane better." Such a distinction is important because people can plan what they do much more readily than they can plan or anticipate the outcomes of their behaviors. Having dinner with Dick and

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[1] Bargh's work also figures prominently in Ouelette and Wood's (1998) discussion of how habit and intention combine to predict behavior. Although Ouelette and Wood were primarily interested in explaining why people exhibit specific target behaviors such as recycling, whereas the present model concerns larger aggregates such as sets or classes of behaviors, Oulette and Wood's conclusions complement the present model.

Jane simply requires eating in their presence, and meeting them at an appropriate place at dinner time constitutes a viable plan. Getting to know Dick and Jane better requires their cooperation, perhaps the mutual recognition of shared values or beliefs, and so on; and it may be difficult, if not impossible, for people to plan this process in the same way they plan more instrumental activities such as allocating one's time at work.

Plans as the Proximal Causes of Day-to-Day Behaviors

The present model assumes that people's plans are the proximal, immediate causes of their day-to-day behaviors. This premise is consistent with numerous theories concerning the roles of intentionality, including the positions advocated by Harré and Secord (1973), Kuhl and Beckman (1985), and Ajzen (1985). Structurally, the proposed relationship between plans and behaviors resembles critical components of Ajzen's (1985) theory of planned behavior. In Ajzen's model, attitudes combine with normative beliefs and perceived control over behavior to form behavioral intentions, and behavioral intentions are the immediate causes of behaviors. In the present model, people's motives and dispositions, their expectations about the likelihood that they can exhibit certain behaviors, and their role obligations combine to create plans that are the immediate causes of day-to-day behaviors.

This is the part of the model most directly concerned with the cognitive dynamics underlying day-to-day social behavior. The model assumes that the primary mechanisms responsible for the distribution of people's time are cognitive in nature. People have plans and expectations for how they will spend their days, and these plans become the causes for their behaviors, social or otherwise. Moreover, assuming that plans are the proximal causes of the distribution of daily activities explains the lack of relationships between quantity of social interaction and psychological well-being. If the distribution of people's time (including the amount of time spent with others) is determined primarily by routinized cognitive constructs such as plans and roles, quantity of interaction and other more socioemotionally focused constructs may be not be closely related.

Daily plans and their relationships to daily activities were examined by Nezlek and Sullivan (1996), and the results of this study support the proposed link between plans and activities. In this study, college student participants described how they allocated their time each day

for 14 days, and some participants also described the plans they had for each day.

Using a standard form, all participants described what they did during each of the 72 20-minute segments into which the 24 hours of a day are divided. They described what they were doing using one of eight mutually exclusive activity categories (socializing, relaxation, study, class, work, life necessity, sleep, and religion), categories based on previous research on social interaction (e.g., Nezlek, Wheeler, & Reis, 1983) and on focus groups that met prior to the study. If a segment involved more than one activity, participants recorded the activity that took up the majority of the time in that segment.

To control for potential reactivity of the procedure, four different recording protocols were used. One group of participants recorded only their activities. The second group indicated how well planned each activity was as they recorded their activities. The third group indicated what they thought they would do the next day (by 20-minute segment) while describing their activities for the current day. The fourth group estimated the total amount of time they would devote to each activity the upcoming day (by category) while describing their activities and how well planned they were for the current day (by segment). It should be noted that the procedure was not reactive. There were no differences between conditions in any of the analyses to be discussed or in analyses of the distribution of activities.

Relationships between plans and activities were examined with a series of multilevel random coefficient modeling analyses in which days were nested within people. In the day-level models in these analyses, the amount of time spent per day in each activity was the dependent measure, and the amount of time planned for that activity was the independent measure. These analyses found that people's plans for how they would allocate their time the next day were good predictors of how they did allocate their time. The results of these analyses are summarized in Table 5.1.

One component of the analyses referred to correspondence between plans and activities at the person level, and for all activities, plans accounted for a substantial proportion of the between-individual variance in amount of activity. Planned time accounted for 76% of the variance in socializing and relaxation, for 61% in class attendance, for 65% in life necessity, for 80% in sleep, and for more than 95% in study, work, and religion. Individuals who on average planned to do more of an activity did more on average, and this correspondence was high for

Table 5.1. *Correspondence Between Actual and Planned Activities*

| | Variance Accounted for by Plans | | | |
	Actual	*Planned*	*Person Level*	*Day Level*
Socializing	9.40	8.68	76	41
Relaxation	10.31	8.83	76	20
Study	11.03	12.88	97	46
Class	6.70	7.32	61	80
Work	1.88	3.02	99	60
Life necessity	8.20	8.45	65	27
Sleep	23.99	22.34	80	26
Religion	.76	1.15	97	70

Note: The first two columns contain the mean number of 20-minute segments that occurred (Actual) and were planned (Planned) for each day.

socializing, the only activity that by definition involved interacting with others.

The analyses also provided estimates of how closely plans and activities corresponded on a day-by-day basis, controlling for individual differences in mean levels of planned and actual activities. Plans also accounted for a substantial proportion of the day-to-day variance in class attendance (80%), religious activity (70%), and work (60%), a moderate proportion of the day-to-day variance in studying (46%) and socializing (41%), and a smaller proportion of the variance in relaxation (20%), sleeping (26%), and life necessity (27%). It is interesting to note that the lowest day-level correspondence was for relaxation, sleep, and life necessity, the three activity categories that are probably bound the least by social norms. In contrast, for going to class, perhaps the most role-defining and role-defined activity for a student, plans accounted for 80% of the variability in day-to-day attendance.

Although these data do not prove that plans caused behaviors, these results are consistent with a model in which plans are causes of behaviors. It is important to keep in mind that plans were made the day before the behaviors occurred, satisfying at least the temporal requirement for a cause. Moreover, distributions of activities did not

vary across conditions, suggesting that participants did not modify their activities because they recorded their plans for the purposes of the study.

As discussed earlier, plans, as presently defined, concern activities or behavioral sequences, not goals or outcomes. This separation of goals and activities distinguishes the present conceptualization of plans from some others. For example, Gollwitzer (1990) discusses plans primarily in terms of how people plan and enact action goals. Within Gollwitzer's conceptualization, planned behaviors are not goals in themselves; they are means to ends. Such a conceptualization would seem to be most applicable to situations in which goals can be clearly articulated, in which action plans can be established, and in which relationships between behaviors and goals are fairly unambiguous and consistent.

Conceptualizing plans in terms of action goals may not be applicable, however, when behaviors are not means to ends but are ends in themselves, and people may frequently encounter such situations in day-to-day life. Role-prescribed behaviors such as arriving at a job punctually may eventually serve some higher goal (not getting fired), but in people's immediate phenomenology, the exhibition of the behavior per se (being on time) is the planned behavior.

Another class of behaviors that would appear to fall outside the class of "means to ends" consists of behaviors that Deci (1972) termed *intrinsically motivated*, behaviors for which the reward (or goal) is the exhibition of the behavior itself. I may play the piano simply because I enjoy playing the piano.[2] This characteristic means that plans to exhibit such behaviors function as goals in the sense that exhibiting the behavior (fulfilling the plan) is the reward.

A third class of behaviors for which an action goal analysis may not be particularly applicable consists of behaviors for which action goal sequences are difficult to formulate. Within a model such as Gollwitzer's, when goals have been identified, action plans are created and action sequences are initiated. What does one do, however, when one's goals are unclear or when goals are not entirely appropriate ways of

[2] Admittedly, one could argue narrowly that playing the piano is a means to an end (feeling good), but such reductionism leads nowhere or to propositions that cannot be refuted. That is, every behavior is a means to an end (feeling good). However valid such a position may be from some perspectives, it would appear that there is some value to assuming that some behaviors or actions are functionally ends in themselves.

representing desired states? For example, it may be quite difficult for people to plan successful interpersonal relationships or encounters. People may not know what they want from their friends, and many may deny (at least consciously) wanting anything more than friendship itself under normal circumstances.

Simple affiliation may be the most important consideration in planning many social activities. People may not know what else they want from social activities if they want anything else at all. Or it may be too difficult for people to formulate goals with sufficient clarity to permit the creation of action plans. Even if goals can be formulated, people may not know enough to create action plans to guide them. The murkiness of interpersonal encounters may make the connection between the exhibition of behaviors and desired outcomes sufficiently tenuous to render behaviors and goals relatively independent.

The foregoing discussion was not intended to argue that people do not have, set, or pursue interpersonal goals. Rather, the primary point is that in terms of their day-to-day behaviors (interpersonal and otherwise), people may not be that consciously and explicitly goal-oriented when goals are defined as some sort of desired end state produced by and separable from their behaviors. When trying to understand the dynamics of day-to-day life, plans themselves, not various sorts of ulterior motives or goals, may be the reason why people engage in certain behaviors.

Finally, for those who cannot imagine that people behave without goals, it may be useful to think of behavioral sequences as proximal goals and outcomes as distal goals. Such a sequence would be more consistent with (although not the same as) models such as Gollwitzer's. Nonetheless, given the qualitative difference between such types of goals, it may be more useful to describe them with different labels while recognizing their similarities within some frameworks.

Outcomes of Activities

In parallel to the present model's distinction between plans and goals, the model also distinguishes activities and outcomes. Having dinner with Dick and Jane is an activity. Enjoying dinner with them and getting better acquainted with them are outcomes that are separable from the activity itself. *Outcomes* are defined as changes that occur in an individual, and as depicted in Figure 5.1, they can take various forms. Outcomes may be more cognitive in nature, such as perceptions

of control, or more affective in nature, and some may not fit easily into either category but may still affect well-being.

Research on reactivity to daily events concerns this component of the model. The dominant focus of this research has been the relationships between negative events (stressors) and mood, and in general, these studies have found that daily negative mood covaries with negative events (e.g., Bolger & Schilling, 1991). On days when people experience more stressors, their moods are more negative.

Although informative, this research has important limitations, two of which are particularly relevant to the parameters specified in the present model. First, these studies have focused exclusively on moods as outcomes. Although mood is an important construct, there are other constructs that merit attention due to their relationships with well-being. Second, these studies have not distinguished social and achievement events, and given the important distinctions that have been drawn between these domains in other literatures, such a distinction should be informative.

A recent series of studies by Nezlek and colleagues addressed such concerns by studying the covariation between daily social and achievement events and psychological states other than mood. In these studies, participants indicated which events occurred during a day, and they provided measures of various psychological states. These data were analyzed with multilevel random coefficient modeling analyses that examined the day-level covariation between psychological states and daily events. In general, these studies support components of the proposed model in that the covariation between social events and well-being was stronger than the covariation between negative events and well-being.

In one study, by Nezlek and Gable (1999), participants provided data every day for 3 weeks. The primary analyses found that both affectively and cognitively focused measures of psychological well-being (self-esteem, anxiety, depressive thinking, perceived control over the environment, and causal uncertainty) covaried positively with positive events and negatively with negative events. Unpublished analyses of these data that distinguished social and achievement events found that although daily well-being covaried with both daily social and achievement events, this covariation tended to be stronger for social events than for achievement events.

In a similar study, by Nezlek and Plesko (2000), participants provided data twice a week for up to 10 weeks. These measures included

daily events, self-esteem, anxiety, depressive thinking, and positive and negative mood. Consistent with the results of Nezlek and Gable (1999), the authors found that daily well-being covaried positively with positive events and negatively with negative events and that this covariation tended to be stronger for social events than for achievement events. The distinction between social and achievement events also figured prominently in a study on day-to-day covariation in self-consciousness. Nezlek (2000) found that daily private and public self-consciousness covaried with daily social events, whereas neither covaried with daily achievement events.

Although informative, these studies do not address the roles played by plans. Such relationships were examined by Nezlek (in press-b) in a paper that presents additional analyses of some of the data discussed by Nezlek and Gable (1999). In addition to measures of well-being, participants in the Nezlek and Gable study provided measures of how well their plans for social and achievement-related activities had been realized each day. Participants' psychological well-being was higher on days when their plans were realized more fully than on days when their plans were realized less fully. Moreover, well-being covaried more strongly with the fulfillment of social plans than with the fulfillment of achievement plans.

The stronger covariation between day-to-day well-being and the fulfillment of social plans suggests that psychological well-being is more closely related to social activities than to achievement activities, a possibility that supports components of the present model. If social plans are not met, if others do not appear when they are supposed to, or if a social event does not turn out as planned, people may begin to feel less secure about their social relationships.

This study was somewhat limited by the fact that no measure of planned activities was collected, a shortcoming addressed by Nezlek and Elia (1998). In this study, each day participants described up to three goals or plans they had for the upcoming day, and they indicated how fully the plans they had made the previous day had been fulfilled. The data were analyzed with a series of multilevel random coefficient modeling analyses in which days were nested within people. Preliminary analyses have found that people who were more poorly adjusted, as measured by the CES-D, accomplished fewer goals (fulfilled fewer plans). Interestingly, more poorly adjusted people also set more difficult goals that they believed would take longer to meet, results consistent with the negative relationships between plan fulfillment and

trait adjustment reported in Nezlek (in press-b) and in Nezlek and Hampton (1996).

Integration and Summary

Although the present model relies upon a different level of analysis than the research and theory described in the other chapters in this volume, it shares features with much of this work. For example, the two needs that serve as the foundation for the present model, the need for control and prediction and the need to belong, figure prominently in research serving as the basis for Andersen and Berenson's chapter in this volume and are part of the model upon which Williams, Wheeler, and Haurey's discussion of ostracism is based, and the need to belong is central to Tice and Faber's discussion of self-presentation.

In terms of focus and level of analysis, the ostracism research discussed by Williams et al. is the most relevant to the present model, and at first glance, it would appear that the two bodies of research are in conflict. Williams et al. suggest that ostracism, the withdrawal of social contact, is associated with various negative outcomes, whereas the present model suggests that social contact per se is not related to psychological well-being. Nevertheless, differences in these conclusions may reflect differences between the two approaches in how social contact is operationalized.

Ostracism, by definition, is the intentional withdrawal of social contact, a withdrawal that may not be desired by the target. In contrast, the social interactions that are the focus of the present model include (and are probably dominated by) events that people choose or plan to have, or, in the case of people with no or few interactions, not to have. It is quite possible that part of the reason some people have relatively few interactions is that others have ostracized them. Nonetheless, it is likely that the bulk of the variability in social activity is determined by factors others than ostracism. This analysis does not imply that ostracism is unimportant. In fact, ostracism's influence on well-being may be inversely related to its frequency – less frequent events may be more influential for various reasons.

Myriad factors influence the course of people's daily lives and people's reactions to their daily lives. Research has tended to focus on relationships between day-to-day life and various motives, goals, and dispositions. The present model complements this research by focusing on relationships between plans and the course of people's daily

lives and reactions to daily life. Moreover, the studies described in this chapter provide preliminary support for some components of the proposed model. Clearly, demonstrating the explanatory power of the proposed model will require further research and deliberation. Nevertheless, the work described in this chapter suggests that such a demonstration is possible.

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